Oil sands operations involve many working groups, which can result in communication silos that make effective risk communication challenging. Workers are also directly at risk when they encounter conditions that contain hazards they are not equipped to identify and control. This is illustrated by fatalities in the oil sands related to unseen ground hazards at tailings storage and transport facilities. This research asked how gaps in communication between different working groups can be identified and how information about risks can be effectively disseminated to workers who interact with these facilities. Using ground hazards as a case study, we analyzed four datasets to identify areas for enhanced risk communication. The aim was to determine the hazards that workers see on the job site and compare their responses to tailings safety experts, geotechnical analysis, and recorded incidents. This will allow for the design of effective risk communication strategies at oil sands tailings operations. Traditional risk communication principles to disseminate information to external stakeholders will be applied to an internal audience of workers in tailings operations. The aim is to enhance the dialogue regarding risks across the organization. This will be done by increasing the knowledge and understanding of ground hazards in oil sands tailings operations, resulting in the invisible becoming seen and the risk tolerance among workers being lowered.
Introduction
Our research is motivated by a workplace fatality that occurred around 6:00 am on 19 January 2014; a worker broke through frozen ground and drowned in an underground cavern that had been created by a pinhole-sized leak of hot tailings from a transportation pipeline (OHS 2017) . In this instance, protocols to ensure the safety of workers had been followed, including the use of pipeline leak detection and mitigation, administrative controls such as call-in procedures, and the use of personal protective equipment (OHS 2017) . Despite these hazard identifications and controls, none of the frontline tailings team knew that a tailings leak could create an underground cavern. Furthermore, leaks from a tailings pipeline tend to give off steam because of the temperature differential between the hot tailings and the ambient environment. As the tailings were draining elsewhere from the cavern, no steam was emitted at the leak site. It was inconceivable to workers that there could be a leak without steam and, hence, there was no warning that the pipeline was leaking at this location. This hazard was also further hidden from view by the snow-and ice-covered ground and early morning darkness (OHS 2017) . In sum, while oil sands companies have created industry best practices such as "Life-Saving Rules" (ESC 2019) and have hazard identification tools such as Field Level Hazard Assessments, ground hazards remain unidentified and incidents such as this still occur.
To combat the unknown ground hazards in tailings operations, we are proposing the application of well-defined external risk communication principles and visual tools to increase the visibility of these presently unseen hazards. We used a mental models approach and spoke with 158 frontline workers, regional contractors, and leaders from multiple oil sands companies to achieve stakeholder engagement. We also conducted a ground hazard assessment by touring various sites in summer, winter, and spring. Tailings safety experts provided us with access to their hazard inventory and oil sands companies gave us access to their incident databases related to tailings.
Based on responses to the interview questions, the tailings safety expert hazard inventory, and the company incident databases, we identified breakdowns in communication. With these breakdowns in communication identified, and the information from the 2014 fatality, we are using ground hazards as a case study to address the communication problems. From our ground hazard assessment, we created visual tools (a flow chart for hazard identification and mitigation and a ground hazard photo database) to help workers identify ground hazards in their work environment.
By using the breakdowns in communication of ground hazards in the oil sands tailings operations as a case study, we extend the literature on seeing the unseen (Haslam et al. 2005; Albert et al. 2014 Albert et al. , 2017 Jeelani et al. 2016; Tixier et al. 2017 ) and confirm similar mechanisms for why ground hazards are not identified in the oil sands tailings environment. However, we disagree with the root cause of worker inability that is alluded to by many scholars (Haslam et al. 2005; Carter and Smith 2006; Hinze 2006; Tixier et al. 2017) . We found the root causes of ground hazards not being identified are culturally systemic in nature (hazards not communicated to workers) as opposed to being solely due to unsafe acts by workers (Albert et al. 2014) . We also provide a case study for the development of visual tools to effectively communicate the risks of unseen ground hazards to an internal audience and bridge cultural breakdowns in communication.
Oil sands tailings operations
Oil sands tailings operations are extensive, comprising the structures needed to contain waste from the open pit mining and extraction process. Essentially, tailings operations store the solids and water balance from oil sands mining operations. The oil sands (8-13% bitumen,~60% silica sand,~30% fine solids, and < 5% water) is transported in haul trucks from the open pit mine to the extraction facility where it is processed to extract the bitumen from the sand (Devenny 2010) . The bitumen is transported to the refinery for upgrading, and the tailings material-a slurry of water, sand, other chemicals, and residual bitumen-is transported to primary containment or the tailings discharge area using pipelines. There is also froth treatment waste (mostly water) that is carried directly to the tailings pond. The tailings slurry is discharged into cells in the tailings discharge area to construct structures such as beaches and dykes for reclamation. The material stored in this area has a larger particle size, similar to sand. The tailings discharge area is slightly declined so that water and any residual fine tailings flow to the centre and are transported via dredge to the tailings pond. The tailings pond contains fluid fine tailings (FFT) which become mature fine tailings (MFT) after an extended period, and process water. The process water is removed from the pond to be recycled and used in other areas of the mine. The MFT is sent for further processing including cake production, dewatering, or drying depending on the site (Devenny 2010).
The incident described at the beginning of this paper occurred in the tailings discharge area of an oil sands tailings operation. Ground hazards such as the one that caused the fatality had been seen at other sites before the incident occurred. There is the potential for ground hazards to manifest in any area of tailings operations.
Methods to increase ground hazard identification in oil sands tailings operations
The identification of hazards through the risk management process, using tools such as Field Level Hazard Assessments, assumes that workers and managers have the skills and knowledge to effectively and accurately complete hazard identification to control hazards and begin work (Bahn 2013) . However, multiple studies (Carter and Smith 2006; Ramsay et al. 2006; Bahn 2013; Perlman et al. 2014; Jeelani et al. 2016) show that most workers and managers are not equipped to adequately identify hazards, especially unknown hazards, in dynamic, complex environments (Jeelani et al. 2016; Namian et al. 2016) ; novice workers are unable to recognize 53% of hazards in their work environments (Bahn 2013) . Our analysis of four datasets-interviews with frontline workers, leadership and regional contractors; a tailings safety expert hazard inventory; incident databases; and a ground hazard assessment-was designed to reveal any similar issues with the communication and identification of ground hazards in oil sands tailings operations.
Interviews
Seven semi-structured interview questions were designed by the authors to build rapport with the interviewees and determine the hazards they are aware of in oil sands tailings operations and the solutions or changes they would like to see with respect to those hazards. The Research Ethics Board (REB) at the University of Alberta approved the methods as well as the interview questions prior to the start of the study. The questions were also vetted by ESC to confirm validity. Each interviewee also signed an informed consent form prior to participating in the study.
We conducted 158 semi-structured interviews with employees and contractors from multiple oil sands companies. Our interviewees included 78 frontline workers (49% of interviewees) (heavy equipment operators, plant operators, and maintenance staff), 33 leaders (21% of interviewees) (site leaders, management, health and safety professionals, and engineers) and 47 regional contractors (30% of interviewees) (dredge and boat operators, geotechnical engineers, roving contractors, and embedded contractors). Many of our interviewees either knew co-workers who had been injured or killed or experienced injuries or near misses themselves. Given this and the sensitive topic of our research, we were pleasantly surprised by the candid nature of the interviewees; this indicated the desire amongst the participants to promote sustainable change.
The authors conducted all interviews. To not interrupt operations, most interviews took place at the oil sands operators' sites; 12 interviews were conducted over the phone by the first author. Most interviews were conducted individually or in pairs. However, a handful of interviews were conducted with 3-4 participants and the authors. Three interviews had more than 4 participants (29 interviewees in total participated in focus group style interviews). Interviews were between 20 and 90 min long, with interviewee responses handwritten by the authors and later typed up by a transcriber. Even though interviews occurred on site, participants were very forthcoming. All were given the opportunity to skip any question and to remove their responses up to two weeks after the study; no participants requested this, but multiple participants called after their interview to add more information. The interviews were analyzed (coded) using QSR NVivo 12.0. Coding is a way to analyze interviews and recognize patterns and themes in the data. The initial analysis focused on the interview questions and specific coding for each interview in its entirety. At this stage, the number of workers who identified a ground hazard in their interview was determined.
Based on the initial analysis and literature review, emergent themes became apparent, and subsequent analysis of the interviews was conducted to code for these themes.
During this second analysis stage the authors used NVivo to develop and relate codes and continually test the plausibility of our theorizing (Lok and De Rond 2013; Huy et al. 2014; Reinecke and Ansari 2015) . The analysis of the interviews involved cycling between our data and the relevant literature to determine breakdowns in the communication of ground hazards in oil sands tailings operations.
Following grounded theory methods, the coding scheme was amended as the analysis progressed (Kreiner et al. 2009 ). Such an abductive approach is "most suited to efforts to understand the process by which actors construct meaning out of intersubjective experience" (Suddaby 2006: pp. 634 ). After cycling iteratively through our interviews, we collapsed these codes into subtheme categories to identify where breakdowns in communication regarding ground hazards is occurring.
Tailings safety expert hazard inventory
Tailings safety experts from multiple oil sands companies toured each other's sites to identify hazards. Energy Safety Canada facilitated this hazard identification activity before the University of Alberta's involvement in the project. The tailings safety experts created a database of over 100 hazards in the tailings operations and began sharing best practices.
The dataset was given to the University of Alberta in 2017, and process safety management tools such as bow tie analysis (Cockshott 2005; Chevreau et al. 2006; Khakzad et al. 2012) were used to cluster the data and determine hazards identified by the tailings safety experts. The bow tie diagrams relating to ground hazards were selected for further analysis.
Incident databases
The participating oil sands companies provided their incident datasets for tailings operations from 2014 to 2017. These incident databases were analyzed to determine the types of hazards associated with incidents at the tailings operations.
The datasets were searched for the following keywords: tailings, ground, pipeline, leak, stuck, sunk, slip, trip, fall, washout, loss of containment, spool leak, steam, ice, and frozen. These keywords were selected to include all incidents that were occurring in tailings operations, in particular those that could be related to ground hazards such as soft ground, surface erosion, subsurface erosion, and slope instability. They were also selected based on information provided from the initial interview analysis and items that were closely related to the 2014 fatality.
The incident data were read by the first author, who has process engineering experience, and then classified into hazard types (ground, chemical, line of fire, etc.) based on process safety definitions (based on a method applied by Cohen 2013 and definitions from Hallowell 2008 and Winkel et al. 2017 , for reliability). The incidents were also coded by a research assistant to confirm reliability as well. The focus of this research is on ground hazards, so any incident that was caused by a ground hazard or could cause a ground hazard was included in the analysis. The results from the data analysis can lead to targeted initiatives to improve safety and performance ).
Ground hazard assessment
The authors conducted site visits in summer, winter, and spring, utilizing the action research model where ground hazards were observed in the field and then reflected upon after the site visits to determine the types of ground hazards that were manifesting (Zuber-Skerritt 2001). This action research cycle continued after each site visit. It was essential to visit in all seasons as tailings is a unique and dynamic environment, and the ground hazards differ over the course of a year.
Photos of representative facilities were taken with descriptions noted in a field journal at all of the participating oil sands tailings operations in each season. The use of photographs instead of drawings was important as they are a more effective way of communicating risk (Haynes et al. 2007 ).
Proposed risk communication strategy
The mental models approach to risk communication is based on the unique interpretation that all people will have regarding information that is used to make decisions or judgment calls (Atman et al. 1994 ). As we were dealing with a large sample set of 158 individuals and their unique opinions on safety in the oil sands tailings operations, we decided that a mental models approach to risk communication should be applied to gain stakeholder engagement, understand the various interpretations of safety in the tailings operations and create risk communication tools that address the gap between the stakeholders (e.g., front line workers and management).
The theoretical flow of information within a company was established, from management to frontline workers in a topdown approach, from workers to management through a chain of command, and laterally between workers and contractors (Riggio 2017) . Breakdowns in communication were identified by comparing the results from the interviews, hazard inventory, and incident databases to the typical hierarchical flow of information.
With the breakdowns in communication identified, the mental models approach was used to design visual tools to decrease risk tolerance and increase knowledge, using ground hazards as a case study. These tools aim to bridge gaps in understanding between different stakeholders. Visual tools were selected as the literature shows a 65% increase in retention of information when a multimodal approach to risk communication is used (Kouyoumdjian 2012) . This approach combines visual, verbal, and written texts to simultaneously transfer information about risks with the goal of making the hidden seen and the mundane memorable.
Results
Findings from our analysis of the interviews and the incident database confirm the results from other studies with respect to workers having a difficult time identifying hazards in dynamic and complex environments. Almost a quarter of all incidents are related to ground hazards, and yet 15% of workers did not identify any ground hazards in their interview when asked about hazards they saw around tailings facilities, dykes, and transport systems. While not enormous, this value does represent a significant number of workers who are not concerned about ground hazards in their work environments. We also found that workers with between five and ten years of tailings experience identified on average ten ground hazards during their interviews. This value was almost double the number of ground hazards identified by workers with less than one year of experience or more than ten years (who identified two on average).
Failure to report hazards was also identified during the analysis of the incident database and interview data. Reported ground hazards made up 11% of the total ground hazard incidents, with 50% of the events caused by soft ground, 21% by slope instability, 21% by surface erosion, and 5% by subsurface erosion. Our analysis of interview data suggests the incident database underreports ground hazards, as 60% of interviewees mentioned soft ground, 52% surface erosion, 39% slope instability, and 6% subsurface erosion.
Further analysis was completed using the interview data to identify breakdowns in the communication of hazards to the different working groups in tailings. These breakdowns relate to all hazards and can be applied to our ground hazard case study. The quotes in Fig. 1 are a representative sample of those provided by interviewees regarding communication breakdowns.
For example, some workers believe that hazards are not known to the planning department because they do not spend time in the field. Contractors and other working groups like maintenance told us that they are not receiving information about work environment hazards on a daily basis. Even when information is passed between shifts, interviewees told us that there is no consistency in the message regarding hazards or incidents. Frontline workers and maintenance staff informed us that the plant does not communicate the actual flow rate of the tailings through the transport lines. This could be leading to premature failure of the pipelines, which could lead to ground hazards like soft ground or erosion features.
In sum, communication in the oil sands tailings operations across the industry has been uncertain, "Don't take anything for granted", ambiguous, "Message different from different supervisors", lacking information, "Tribal knowledge: training doesn't cover, and no one knows why it's being done", and subject to internal and external demands, "Supervisors ask things of workers that are not safe. They don't know it's not safe, but the worker is scared to say so". Companies have already begun to bridge these gaps in communication. The tailings safety expert hazard inventory is an example of bridging communications between the oil sands companies. This activity included touring each other's sites and sharing best practices, such as the implementation of infrared cameras on bulldozers to increase visibility in steamy winter conditions. During this collaboration, the participating companies identified two ground hazards (pipeline leaks and soft ground) as the top priority hazards needing further mitigation in the tailings industry.
Discussion
Breakdowns in the communication of ground hazards have been identified by analyzing the tailings incident database, interview data, and hazard inventory.
Systemic cultural roots within an organization, not simply unsafe acts by workers, are causing breakdowns in communication within oil sands tailings operations and causing hazards to go unseen and un-reported ( Fig. 1) .
We propose the use of visual tools to address communication breakdowns, reduce exposure risk, and make workers aware of the potential for unseen ground hazards. The goals of our risk communication strategy are to increase the knowledge and visibility of ground hazards, resulting in decreased risk tolerance.
We developed three visual tools for use in our risk communication approach to make the invisible seen: a Hazard Identification Flow Chart, a Ground Hazard Framework with accompanying Ground Hazard Photo Database.
These visual tools will also be displayed on the work site, ideally in lunch trailers near the operations to encourage collaboration, remind workers of hazards, and promote increased hazard recognition of known and previously unknown hazards. This method of Hazard Identification and Transmission was developed specifically for dynamic work environments and can increase hazard recognition by 29% (Albert et al. 2014 ).
Hazard identification flow chart
Many articles discuss the process of hazard identification and control (Chen et al. 2013; Albert et al. 2014; Hallowell and Hansen 2016; Jeelani et al. 2016) . They all commence with seeing or identifying the hazard, as noted in Appendix (Fig. 3) (Hallowell and Hansen 2016) . We found that many of these discussions are missing a key component: the differentiation between understanding (or perceiving the risk) and tolerating the risk. The perception of risk is influenced by many external and internal factors, including state of mind, inattention, and training/ knowledge of hazards (Sylvester 2017) . Without perception of the hazard, the likelihood of an incident occurring increases as there is no critical thinking about the risk (Albert et al. 2013 ). If the hazard is not understood, it is not fully seen, and it is therefore impossible for the worker to choose if they want to or can tolerate the risk.
Risk tolerance is also a challenging topic as it too is influenced by both internal and external factors. Some workers may be predisposed to a high risk tolerance compared to others, and this was recognized by the interview participants: "some people don't see hazards in anything…some people have higher risk tolerance". The company itself may also be unintentionally influencing a worker's risk tolerance, such as if "[workers] feel under pressure to work fast and go closer to equipment than they should". The risk tolerance
Verbatim Examples
First-Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions "No sense someone siƫng in office doing the planning who's never seen the field." "Planning don't wanna hear it. Brought right up to planning trying to make it work beƩer, no collaboraƟon"
Between frontline operaƟons and planning "If there is a big event, then there is good communicaƟon. Day to day events and risks are not communicated."
Between owner company and contractors "Crew to crew, one gets info and one doesn't"
"Not a lot of cross boundary communicaƟon" "People don't totally understand. If you plug the ass up, you can't keep eaƟng. Need more relaƟonships to discuss how things flow"
Between frontline operaƟons and plant "Breakdown in communicaƟon with plant and tailings: detect thin pipes, all based on a parƟcular velocity, but the lines are not run at this velocity all the Ɵme. This leads to double or triple the wear rate"
Breakdowns in communicaƟon
Between operaƟons (i.e., mining and tailings) Between cross shiŌs "No reporƟng of near misses; such a big tell" "Incidents happen and people don't know"
"Message different from different supervisors"
Between frontline operaƟons and management "Don't take anything for granted" Dynamic operaƟons "Tribal knowledge: training doesn't cover, and no one knows why it's being done" Lack of informaƟon "Supervisors ask things of workers that are not safe. They don't know it's not safe, but the workers are scared to say so"
Internal and external demands (2015). The last stage of the hazard identification figure is the effective control of the hazard through the hierarchy of controls. Elimination or substitution is the ideal mitigation strategy, followed by engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment. It is also important to build in redundancy and have multiple controls in place in case one or more fail; this is called the layers of protection approach (Baybutt 2002; Summers 2003) .
One of the key takeaways from Fig. 3 is the need for a multifaceted approach to risk communication, where information is disseminated to workers, but their perception and risk tolerance are also taken into account in the communication strategy. If risks are not understood/perceived, the rest of the risk mitigation strategy is not executed, and hazards may be left uncontrolled.
Ground hazard framework
Tailings operations are unique and dynamic, and these attributes are emphasized during seasonal transitions. Therefore, we created a tailings ground hazard framework and three work environment photo databases (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4) as mechanisms to communicate the risk of ground hazards to personnel in the field including contractors.
The framework for communicating the risk of ground hazards to all workers is provided in Table 1 . The geotechnical engineers in industry and academia are aware of ground hazards and their manifestations, yet 15% of participants did not identify a single ground hazard in their interview. This high number of people not identifying ground hazards, in addition to the other breakdowns in communication (Fig. 3) , indicate that knowledge of hazards is not translated to all workers in oil sands tailings operations.
The framework discusses the four main ground hazards identified by the authors on the site visits: soft ground, surface erosion, subsurface erosion, and slope instability. This classification was based on the authors' experience, the incidents recorded in the incident database, and how these ground hazards manifest. Notably, multiple ground hazards were seen at the same time in the oil sands tailings operations.
Soft ground includes such manifestations as poor/untrafficable roads, flooded or overpoured cells, spills and uncontrolled releases, drainage problems, pipeline misalignment, and water coming up through the ground. Surface erosion includes cuts in the cells, washouts, erosion gullies, pipeline misalignment, cell berm breaches, cracks in the benches and berms, and uneven ground. Subsurface erosion includes uneven ground, sinkholes, ground instability, and cave-ins. This type of erosion is very dangerous as it is visually obscured and physically unseen. Slope instability includes sloughing (sand or soil falling off slopes in sheets and slumps due to loss of cohesion) or failures of the benches and berms surrounding the coarse tailings dump and tailings ponds.
All of these ground hazards are influenced by temporal factors such as heavy rain, dust, spring thaw, and winter conditions such as ice, snow-covered ground, steam, and reduced daylight hours. These temporal factors can affect the likelihood of a ground hazard manifesting, i.e., increased amounts of standing water on roads during spring melt. They can also impact the likelihood of a ground hazard being identified, i.e., snow and ice could make it challenging to identify surface erosion in the tailings discharge area, or steam could decrease the visibility for a bulldozer operator in the tailings discharge area and make it challenging to identify cuts (surface erosion) in the cell. The likelihood values in Table 1 were determined using the incident database. These values were used to determine qualitative likelihood values (very likely, likely, unlikely, very unlikely) for each of the four ground hazards: soft ground, surface erosion, subsurface erosion, and slope instability. The consequence was also determined by using the incident database and looking at the severity of the incidents related to each ground hazard. Slope instability was ranked as a high consequence as this could lead to a loss of containment event in the tailings discharge area or on a tailings pond, which could affect workers, the environment, and potentially the public. Soft ground is a low consequence as it usually results in stuck equipment with minimal impact on equipment and workers. Erosion features are ranked as a medium consequence as incidents included The controls for these hazards are mainly operating procedures (including preventative maintenance, structured rounds, and reporting systems) and training; 54% of the hazard controls mentioned in the interviews related to administrative controls such as safe operating distances from discharge lines or working alone procedures. This value was confirmed after discussions with tailings engineers, who indicated engineering and elimination/ substitution controls are built into the design, but daily operating controls are typically administrative. Engineering controls are also used to manage risk, including end of line devices to dissipate kinetic energy and decrease the severity of the cuts that form in the cells (Fig. 2) , elevating the pipelines on blocking for full visibility (Fig. 2) , and infrared cameras on bulldozers to increase visibility in steam.
Ground hazard photo database
Site visits to multiple oil sands companies were completed in summer, winter, and spring and photo databases compiled, each including photos of tailings storage facilities (i.e., process water ponds, fine tailings ponds, and tailings discharge area), tailings transport facilities (i.e., the pipeline from extraction to the tailings discharge area and pumps from the fine tailings pond), and dykes (i.e., the slope of the tailings pond).
An example of the spring ground hazard database can be seen in Table 2 . The winter and summer ground hazard databases are located in Appendix for the reader's reference (Tables 3 and 4 ). The spring, winter, and summer ground hazard databases are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively. These databases include specific locations and photos in the oil sands tailings operations and a description of the ground hazard shown in the picture. Possible consequences if the ground hazard were to manifest and not be adequately controlled are also listed, along with precursory conditions that could indicate the formation of one or more of these ground hazards. The last column is the general temporal factors that might impact the likelihood or consequences of the ground hazard manifesting or being identified.
Each figure was divided into simplified ground hazard classifications as the workers in the tailings operations are not formally trained on geotechnical hazards. The more encompassing geotechnical definitions are based on natural phenomena whereas the ground hazards that manifest in tailings operations are in a hydraulically placed area; therefore, these simplified definitions are appropriate given the environment and the audience.
Not included in any of the tables is differential settlement. The authors chose to exclude differential settlement from the analysis as any manifestations of hazards with a high consequence to workers were included under one of the other ground hazards; for example, uneven ground is classified under surface erosion and sink holes and cavern formation are classified under subsurface erosion. Other instances of differential settlement are considered a maintenance issue as well as a potential cause of slips, trips, and falls, which are ubiquitous around any heavy industry and also included in the other ground hazard classifications.
This framework is designed to be a tool to show workers what potential unseen ground hazards in tailings operations could look like. Workers should still identify the hazards associated with their job task using the hazard identification tools provided, such as Field Level Hazard Assessments, but these photo databases will highlight examples of ground hazards that may manifest in their work environment. It is extremely rare for these ground hazards to manifest in isolation. Instead, there is a higher probability that a worker will see surface erosion features as well as soft ground, such as cuts and soft ground that manifest in tailings discharge cells and pose a threat to bulldozer operators becoming stuck or sunk.
An example for spring conditions is discussed here for illustrative purposes. Photo (f) in Table 2 depicts muddy and soft ground conditions between pipelines in a working area. Workers need to maneuver between the pipes to complete maintenance activities as well as daily operations. Consequences of soft ground in this working environment range in severity from loss of productivity if a worker is stuck in soft ground to worker injury or fatality if the soft ground is deeper than anticipated.
A precursory event for soft ground and muddy conditions could be the beginning of spring thaw. The speed of melt and amount of snow will affect the severity of soft ground conditions. Distinguishing between wet areas and soft ground conditions can also be difficult, especially when there is a narrow space between the pipes to work. Temporal factors that affect the consequence and likelihood of soft ground manifesting in this area include spring melt and heavy precipitation events increasing the amount of soft ground. Additional factors are the unknown depth of water, snow and ice reducing visibility, and soft ground being even more difficult to identify at night without proper lights to illuminate the working area.
Controls to mitigate the consequences of soft ground will include (1) administrative controls such as snow removal to decrease the amount of snow during spring melt and (2) personal protective equipment such as steel-toed rubber boots.
Conclusion
A breakdown in communication of ground hazards within oil sands tailings operations was identified, with 15% of workers not identifying a single ground hazard during their interview. Ground hazards are also underrepresented in incident databases compared to interview responses. The consequence is that fatalities related to ground hazards still occur (Government of Alberta 2017). Workers with between five and ten years of tailings experience were better at identifying ground hazards than those of other experience levels.
The result of the breakdowns in communication in tailings operations is that ground hazards are not being seen or understood. There is a need to communicate these risks to workers so they can be adequately controlled.
The inclusion of visuals in the ground hazard photo database is useful and effective for communicating risks to workers and making the invisible seen. It is also essential to bridge systemic culture roots that impede the flow of communication to protect workers in the challenging and dynamic oil sands tailings operations. This research used ground hazards as a case study, however, this work is applicable to other hazards in the oil sands tailings operations as well.
Limitations
Six main limitations are identified with respect to the interviews: (1) not all interviews had identifiable speakers, as some were conducted as focus groups; (2) interviews were handwritten by the authors, which could have resulted in comments being missed during the interview process; (3) workers could have been using the interview as a forum to complain about management; however, this did not seem to be the case as the authors got a sense of pride with respect to the tailings operations from the employees and contractors; it was a positive, refreshing, and informative process; (4) contractors could have provided answers with a positive spin so as not to lose contracts; and (5) some interviews were cut short if they ran over the scheduled hour and workers had to return to their jobs.
